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Abstract
This paper studies investment decisions by economic agents in cases where the
tax rate is decided through voting. It will be shown that, in some cases, only a
Pareto-dominated tax policy on the wrong side of the Laer curve is supported under
rational expectations. Thus, the governments may collect revenue in an inecient
way. To that end, a quite plausible assumption, the endogeneity of the return on
investment, is essential. Therefore this paper warns about the danger of ineciency
in a wide variety of policies. Further, the model predicts that when the inequality
in an economy is low, the tax policy on the wrong side is likely to arise.
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1 Introduction
It is believed that govenmental policy is responsible for economic development. Espe-
cially, the tax policy aects citizens' behaviors with regard to labor supply and capital
accumulation, and thereby determines the development level. Therefore, the institution
dening how to decide economic policies is an important element in economic growth.
Recently, studies on political economy increasingly suggest that policies are not deter-
mined by a benevolent government, but that conicts among self-interested agents are
somehow coordinated in a certain way and then policies determined. In this context, this
study uses a political economy model with investment decisions by citizens to show that
an inecient policy may emerge. Here, an inecient policy refers to the tax policy along
the wrong side of the Laer curve, which is Pareto-dominated. Therefore, although the
government can raise the same level of revenue with a lower tax rate, it chooses a higher
tax rate and consequently suers from less investment. The focus of the paper is to show
that such an inecient policy is a unique equilibrium.
The model used in this paper is a simple two-period general equilibrium model.
Individuals dier in capital holdings at the beginning. They invest capital for next
period consumption, expecting the return on capital and tax rate chosen in the future.
In the model, the tax is levied only on capital income, which is politically determined
by majority voting. It is well known that endogenous policy determination coupled with
investment decisions is likely to support multiple rational expectations on both sides
of the Laer curve.1 Saint-Paul and Verdier (1997) analyze the case when a country
is subject to multiple equilibria and ascertain how these are sustained. They use a
model where agents have dierent capabilities to access world capital markets. In their
model, multiple equilibria are likely to occur when the decisive voter on tax policy has
a higher elasticity for tax evasion than the average voter. However, their equilibria
consist of two scenarios: multiple equilibria with low and high taxes; and a unique
low-tax equilibrium. The present paper oers another scenario, that of a unique high-
tax equilibrium on the wrong side of the Laer curve. For such analysis, this paper
emphasizes that the endogeneity of capital return is essential for an inecient revenue
1Persson and Tabellini (2000, Ch. 12) discuss the multiplicity problem, using a simple dynamic
taxation model.
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collection by the government.
As discussed above, the multiplicity of equilibria is pervasive in dynamic taxation
models with endogenous policy making. A Pareto-dominated equilibrium is often seen
as a coordination failure among economic agents. And this disastrous equilibrium is
sometimes ignored by assuming that economic agents can somehow coordinate their
expectations (Persson and Tabellini (1994)). However, it is shown in this paper that there
can be no room for coordinations and that the disastrous outcome may be inevitable.
Some literature in public economics show that the tax rate can be on the declining
portion of the Laer curve (Yitzhaki (1987) and Slemrod and Yitzhaki(2002)). However,
these studies dier from this paper in the sense that the tax policy is exogenously given.
This paper is also related to Traxler (2012), who studies welfare consequences of the
tax policy determined by majority voting in a model of tax avoidance. Traxler (2012)
shows that the politically determined tax rate is generally inecient. However, the
terminology \inecient" used in Traxler (2012) diers from the one used in this paper.
Traxler (2012) says \inecient" when there is a divergence from the welfare-maximizing
policy according to a certain welfare function. On the other hand, this paper uses the
term \inecient" if the policy is worse for everyone, i.e. Pareto-dominated, compared to
another feasible policy. In fact, a Pareto-dominated tax policy is never an equilibrium in
Traxler (2012). Buchanan and Lee (1982) explains how the tax rate on the wrong side of
the Laer curve would be sustained with endogenous policy determination by political
decision makers. Their arguments depend on the assumption that the political decision
makers are more short-sighted than citizens. Short-sighted politicians do not take into
account the eect that a high tax rate today distorts resource allocations in the future.
And they seek an increased government revenues with a high tax rate today, which is
so high and beyond the peak of the long-run Laer curve.2 The present paper provides
an alternative mechanism to end up with such a Pareto-dominated policy. Two critical
assumptions, but plausible, lead to ineciency. The one is, as mentioned above, the
endogeneity of the return on investment. The other is the timing of policymaking, or
2Further, using a political contest model between politicians and citizens, Ihori and Yang (2012) point
out that a tax rate beyond the peak has an eect to undermine political eorts by citizens. And they
show the possibility to have a tax rate on the right side of the Laer curve. Wrede (2000) analyzes the
case where a number of governments put taxes on shared tax sources, which can result in overtaxation
on the downward-sloping part of the Laer curve.
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put dierently, a lack of commitment. Because the two conditions are common features
in real-life economies, the model has a general applicability and can be extended to
analyze a wide range of policies.
For a positive analysis, the model predicts that when the inequality in an economy
is low, the tax policy on the wrong side of the Laer curve is likely to occur. This result
is consistent with Trabandt and Uhlig (2011). They use a neoclassical growth model to
calibrate and show that Denmark and Sweden are on the wrong side of the Laer curve
for capital taxation. On the other hand, countries with high inequality, such as U.S. and
U.K., are on the left side. Therefore this paper gives a rationale for their results.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. The equilib-
rium policy is derived and investigated in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the assumptions
in the model and oers some extensions. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
Individuals with a mass of 1 are inhabitants of an economy. They live for two periods
and dier with respect to capital holdings bi  0 at period 1. Its cumulative distribution
function is denoted by G(). Its mean is denoted by b. In the rst period, each individual
receives his income for supplying one-unit labor and renting their capital to a competitive
rm. The consumer either consume or save his income. In the second period, he supplies
one unit of labor inelastically, and receive capital income from their savings.
An agent's preference is dened over consumption in both periods and public goods
in the second period, and given by
U(ci;1; ci;2) = u(ci;1) + (u(ci;2) + v(x))
= log ci;1 + (log ci;2 +  log x); (1)
where ci;1, ci;2 respectively represent the rst and second period consumption for an agent
i and  denotes a discount factor. The level of public goods provided by government is
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represented by x  0. The budget constraint of individual i is given by
8>><>>:
ci;1 + si = w1 + r1bi
ci;2 = w2 + (1  )r2si
; (2)
where si, wt, rt and  denote the saving of individual i at period 1, the wage rate at
period t, the return on capital at period t and the capital income tax rate, respectively.
Note that capital fully depreciates in the second period. Also, for simplicity, it is assumed
that the government can levy a tax only on capital income.
In each period, competitive rms maximize their prot according to the following
production function,
F (Kt; Lt) = AK

t L
1 
t : (3)
In the second period, the government collects its revenue from capital income tax to
provide public goods. The government budget is
x =
Z
r2sidH(si); (4)
where H() is the cumulative distribution function of saving from period 1, which is
generated through the rst-period decisions by individuals. It is assumed that the gov-
ernment can use the technology which translates one nal good into one public good.
As in Persson and Tabellini (2000, Ch. 12) and others, the timing of events is as
follows; investment decisions followed by voting on the tax rate.
1. In the rst period, each individual decides how to allocate income between con-
sumption and saving.
2. At the end of the rst period, the tax rate on capital income is decided through a
majority voting.
3. In the second period, given the tax rate, individuals consume their income and
gain benets from public goods provided by the government.
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Note that individuals make their decisions before the tax policy is determined. There-
fore, they must expect which level of capital tax will be imposed in the second period.3
This timing of events is crucial for the following results. The wrong side of the Laer
curve is never chosen if the rst and second events are replaced. It is because, if the
tax policy chosen is on the wrong side, there must exist a better way to collect the
government revenue without any loss. However, when the timing is as above, there can
be an equilibrium with the right side of the Laer curve.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
This section provides the equilibrium of this economy. It is shown, in some cases, that
only the wrong side of the Laer curve is an equilibrium. Note that economic agents have
a perfect foresight. And an equilibrium refers to a rational expectations equilibrium.
3.1 Equilibrium
The return on each production factor for t = 1; 2 is given by
8>><>>:
rt = AK
 1
t L
1 
t
wt = (1  )AKt L t
: (5)
By maximizing utility (1) with the budget constraint (2), the consumers' saving
function is obtained as
si(
e) =

1 + 
(w1 + r1bi)  1
1 + 
w2
(1   e)r2 ; (6)
where  e denotes the expected capital tax rate. Note that the saving of each agent
is decreasing in the expected capital tax rate (@si(
e)=@ e < 0).
Because the labor supply is xed to the number of population, the labor market
3It can be interpreted as follows: the government promises a tax policy at the beginning of the rst
period, but cannot commit to that. The actual policy is chosen at the end of the rst period by taking
private agents decisions as given.
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clearing condition is
Lt = 1 for t = 1; 2: (7)
The amount of capital supplied to the market in the rst period is xed and given by
the total amount of capital holdings at the beginning. However, its amount in the second
period is endogenously determined through saving decisions by agents. Therefore, using
(6), the conditions to clear the capital market are obtained as follows.
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
K1 = b
K2 =
R
sidH(si)
 R 1+ (w1 + r1bi)  11+ w2(1 e)r2dG(bi)
: (8)
At the voting stage, as each individual's capital holding for period 2 is already prede-
termined, the tax policy does not distort capital accumulation from then on. Therefore,
the wage rate and the return on capital are xed at the voting stage. The preferred tax
policy for the agent with the saving of si solves the following
max

(u(ci;2) + v(x));
subject to
8>><>>:
ci;2 = w2 + (1  )r2si
x =
R
r2sidH(si)
;
given w2; r2 and [si]
1
i=0:
The rst-order condition for this problem is
  r2si
w2 + (1   i)r2si +

 i
= 0; (9)
where  i is dened as the best policy for the individual with si.
4 The rst term represents
the utility loss as the tax rate marginally increases. The second term is the marginal
4Here  i  1 is allowed. However, any policy with   1 is excluded as an equilibrium, since it is
unrealistic.
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benet from an increased amount of public goods. Note that because of the log utility,
the preferred policy is irrelevant to redistributive concern and does not depend on other
agents' savings. In this economy, the policy is determined by a majority voting. The
equilibrium policy never loses against any policy in a pair-wise voting, which is called the
Condorcet winner. Because agents' preferences are single-peaked, there exists a unique
Condorcet winner, the policy which the median voter prefers, med.5 For expositional
reason, assume that the median has more wealth in the rst period than the mean.6 This
assumption is justied by the observation that rich individuals have a high propensity
to give political contributions. When rich voters engage in political activities more than
poorer ones, the \politically median" voter should be richer than the actual median
voter, and could be richer than the mean. Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) presents the
data which shows the propensity to participate in every form of political activity rises
with income.7
Equations (5), (6), (7), (8), (9) and the rational expectations requirement med =  e
jointly determine the equilibrium. Hereafter, the equilibrium tax rate is represented by
.
3.2 the Laer curve
In order to evaluate the equilibrium policy obtained in the previous section, this section
provides the conguration of the Laer curve. The Laer curve is the relationship
between the tax rate and the government revenue.
The government's revenue  is dened as
 
Z
r2sidH(si):
Combining (5), (6), (7) and (8),  can be calculated as follows.
5See Persson and Tabellini (2000).
6It ensures that the equilibrium policy is unique (see the Appendix).
7Benabou (2000) employs the assumption that voters with more wealth have more votes. Bourguignon
and Verdier (2000) also uses this kind of assumption in a theoretical model. They suppose that individuals
with enough income (or education) have a right to vote. This is motivated by historical examples that
voting rights were restricted to individuals with enough property.
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 = A
 
Ab
(1 + ) + 1 
1
1 
!
: (10)
The Laer curve in this model is unimodal, as usual. The tax rate which attains the
maximal government revenue, max, is obtained from the rst order condition for (10).
That tax rate satises max 2 (0; 1) and the following equation,
@=@ = 0()
(1 + )(max)2  

2(1 + ) +
1  

(1 + )

max + (1 + ) +
1  

= 0:
3.3 Ineciency in scal policy
This subsection investigates whether the tax rate determined through voting is on the
left or right side of the Laer curve. To see this, compute the equilibrium tax rate.
Combining (5), (7) and (8), the aggregate capital holdings at period 2 is obtained,
depending on the expected tax rate.
K2 =
Ab
(1 + ) + 1 
1
1 
 (): (11)
() reveals the intuitive relationship that the capital accumulation is decreasing in
the tax rate. Next, using (5), (6), (7) and (9), the median-preferred tax policy can be
obtained, relating to the aggregate capital.
K2 =

1  
A[(1  )b + b 1bmed](   (1  ))(1  )
(1  ) +   
(): (12)
Figure 1 shows the equilibrium policy determination at the intersection of the two
functions. It can be shown that the equilibrium tax rate  is unique and interior.8
If the condition below is satised, the politically-determined tax rate is beyond the
8See the Appendix.
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()

()
O 
1+
1


max
Figure 1: Equilibrium policy on the wrong side of the Laer curve
peak of the Laer curve and gets trapped into ineciency.9 If this is the case, the tax
policy is Pareto-dominated and there exists an alternative that every agents prefers.
(max) > 
(max): (13)
In what situations, this inecient tax collection is likely to arise? First, when the
inequality of the economy, relative richness of the median to mean, is small (low in-
equality), the ineciency in scal policy tends to occur. It is because the median with a
lower capital holdings prefers a higher tax rate as the tax burden of less wealth is small
(see equation (9)). Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) calibrates a neoclassical growth model
and argues that Denmark and Sweden are on the \wrong" side of the Laer curve for
capital income taxation, while other high-inequality countries like U.S. are on the left
side. Their results are consistent with the observation in the model that countries with
low inequality are likely to suer from inecient scal policies. Second, the preference
for public goods is also important. The reason is quite simple. When the preference
for public goods is strong, the median demands a higher tax rate to obtain more public
goods.
However, why is it impossible to have the lower tax rate which attains the same
9The parameter set which satises the assumptions and equation (13) is reasonably large. For a
quantitative example, A = 1;  = 0:3;  = 0:5;  = 2;b = 1; bmed = 2.
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government revenue as ? That tax policy, say ^ , must be better for every agent
(Pareto-dominating ), since it achieves the same revenue (consequently, the same level
of public goods) and incurs less distortion to economic activities. Consider the situation
that the tax policy is committed to be ^ and that every individual believes it. Then the
aggregate investment in the economy would increase and the return on capital would be
low. Observing this, which tax rate would the median choose? Because the tax burden
is now small due to the low return on capital, the median would never prefer ^ and adopt
another higher tax rate. Therefore the commitment for the tax rate ^ is not credible.
It is the reason why the Pareto-dominating policy, ^ , is not supported under rational
expectations.
4 Discussion
This section discusses a few assumptions which are crucial to get the main results in this
paper. Also, some extensions will be provided.
4.1 Discussion on assumptions
There are two critical assumptions in the model. First, it is the timing of events; the
policy determination after investment decisions. If the policy is decided at the beginning,
the tax rate would never be on the wrong side.10 The second is the endogeneity of return
on capital. With exogenous return on capital, Pareto-dominating tax rate ^ is also an
equilibrium policy. Whichever the median voter commits ^ or , both are credible. And
two tax rates can be rational expectation equilibria, because the median does not change
preferred tax rate with exogenous return.11 There are some previous studies which
show two possible tax rates on both sides of the Laer curve with exogenous return on
capital (Saint-Paul and Verdier (1997) and Persson and Tabellini (2000, Ch. 12)). The
distinct feature of this model is that only the wrong side can be a rational expectation
equilibrium, incorporating the endogenous return on investment. The multiplicity issue
is well known in dynamic taxation models with endogenous policy making. A Pareto-
dominated equilibrium is often seen as a coordination failure among economic agents.
10Another interpretation is that a lack of commitment results in the ineciency in scal policy.
11When endogenous return on capital, recall the argument in the last paragraph in Section 3.
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And this disastrous equilibrium is sometimes ignored by assuming that economic agents
can somehow coordinate their expectations (Persson and Tabellini (1994)). However, this
paper emphasizes that there can be no room for coordinations and that the disastrous
outcome may be inevitable.
4.2 Extensions
For a very simple model, several extensions would be available. The same structure
applies for many policy-determining situations. For instance, a child allowance may be
a good example. Families decide how many children to have before the scal policy
on a child allowance is adopted. Because the government budget is usually approved
annually, while the decision for the quantity of children is a long term decision. And the
return on a child in terms of the wage earned by each child is endogenous, because of
the wage rate determination through the labor market in the future. Therefore there is
a possibility that a child allowance policy can be on the \wrong side" among possible
policies. Another example is education. Consider an income tax and agents' education
decisions. Younger voters have to decide whether to receive higher education before
their voice in political spheres is empowered compared to older voters. Therefore the
policy choice led by young voters is postponed long after education. Of course, the
return on education depends on relative scarcity of skilled workers to unskilled workers,
which is endogenous. Hence, as is the case with child allowance, a politically determined
income tax rate may be Pareto-dominated and too high so that it excessively distorts
education decisions. Calvo (1988) shows that multiple equilibria may arise in a model of
public debt repayment. There exist a Pareto-ecient equilibrium where there is no debt
repudiation and a Pareto-inecient equilibrium in which debt is partially repudiated.
This is analogous to multiple equilibria on both sides of the Laer curve in Persson and
Tabellini (2000, Ch. 12). By endogenizing the relevant variable in Calvo (1988),12 it
may lead to a unique inecient outcome.
12In his model, the interest factor of the public debt is exogenous. However, it seems natural to think
that the interest factor is increasing in the total amount of outstanding bonds.
11
5 Conclusion
This paper shows that an endogenous tax policy may generate an extremely inecient
government activity, the wrong side of the Laer curve. To that end, there are two
critical, but totally plausible, assumptions; the timing of policy making and endogeneity
of the return on capital. Because some tax policies are determined after agents' decision
makings, the government's performance can often get trapped into ineciency. This
point is repeatedly emphasized in previous studies which argue multiple policies on the
both sides of the Laer curve can be possible. However, together with the endogeneity
of the return on capital, citizens may suer from the wrong side of the Laer curve, the
unique possible outcome. The mechanics of the model have a general applicability and
can be extended to analyze a wide range of policies.
Appendix
Uniqueness of the interior equilibrium tax rate
To obtain the equilibrium tax rate, solve the following equation,
() = 
();
() A
b
(1 + ) + 1 
1
1 
=

1  
A[(1  )b + b 1bmed](   (1  ))(1  )
(1  ) +  :
(A.1)
Because (A.1) is a third degree equation, the number of solutions is at most three.
Also note that  = 1 is an obvious solution. Thanks to bmed > b, the following inequality
is straightforward,
0 >
d
d
()

=1
>
d
d

()

=1
;
which implies that the slope of 
() is steeper than that of () at  = 1, as shown
in Figure 1. Note that (0) > 0 > 
(0). By the continuity of both functions, it follows
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that the interior solution must be unique. 
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